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Abstract. We analyse active space debris removal efforts from a
strategic, game-theoretic perspective. An active debris removal mis-
sion is a costly endeavour that has a positive effect (or risk reduction)
for all satellites in the same orbital band. This leads to a dilemma:
each actor (space agency, private stakeholder, etc.) has an incentive
to delay its actions and wait for others to respond. The risk of the
latter action is that, if everyone waits the joint outcome will be catas-
trophic leading to what in game theory is referred to as the ‘tragedy
of the commons’. We introduce and thoroughly analyse this dilemma
using simulation and empirical game theory in a two player setting.
1 INTRODUCTION AND RELATEDWORK
Since the late 1950s a number of public and private actors have
launched a multitude of objects into Earth orbits with low or no in-
centive to remove them after their life span. As a consequence, there
are now many inactive objects orbiting Earth, which pose a consid-
erable risk to active spacecraft. By far, the highest spatial density of
such objects is in the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) environment, defined
as the region of space around Earth within an altitude of 160 km
to 2,000 km. According to most simulations and forecast, the den-
sity of objects in LEO is destined to increase due to the rate of new
launches, on-orbit explosions, and object collisions being higher than
the capability of the LEO environment to clean itself using the natu-
ral orbital decay mechanism. The objective of this paper is to model
this effect and understand its consequences. We thus introduce a non-
cooperative game between self-interested agents in which the agents
are the owners of space assets. Using a high-fidelity simulator we
estimate payoffs to the agents for different combinations of actions
taken, and analyse the resulting game in terms of best-response dy-
namics and (Nash) equilibria. Contrary to the urgency of the space
debris dilemma there has not been much attention to this problem
in scientific circles. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to
consider this dilemma in the context of multi-agent strategic decision
making using empirical game theoretic techniques.
Our study can be placed in the context of two different areas of re-
lated work. Firstly, from a simulation modelling perspective various
attempts have been made to accurately predict the evolution of space
debris and the resulting risk of collisions for active spacecraft. One
of the earliest analyses of the projected evolution of space debris was
done by Donald J. Kessler in 1978 [4]. This study led to the definition
of the “Kessler Syndrome”, a scenario where the density of objects
in LEO becomes high enough to cause a cascade of collisions, each
producing new debris and eventually saturating the environment, ren-
dering future space missions virtually impossible. As a result, active
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debris removal (ADR) methods, in which spacecraft are deployed to
capture and de-orbit larger pieces of debris and out-of-service satel-
lites, are now considered by many as a necessary step to ensure sus-
tainability of LEO [5]. Secondly, from a game theoretic perspective,
researchers have utilised similar methods to study related problems
of environmental pollution, and the shared exploitation of scarce re-
sources. For example, carbon dioxide abatement modelled as a dif-
ferential game [7].
We base our study on Liou and Johnson’s single-agent ap-
proach [5] but, in contrast, consider a multi-agent scenario in which
different space actors independently choose their removal strategy.
In our model we implement individualised object removal criteria
based on the potential risk to important assets of each of the actors.
Our analysis is based on methods from empirical game theory [8] to
convert empirical data to strategic (normal-form) games.
2 DEBRIS SIMULATION AND GAMEMODEL
Our simulator builds on the Python scientific library PyKep [2],
which provides basic tools for astrodynamics research such as satel-
lite orbit propagators. To simulate the future development of space
debris in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) we develop several sub-modules,
including a collision model and a break-up model. To evaluate the
probability of collision between objects we implement the Cube ap-
proach [6]. We follow NASA’s standard breakup model [3] to gen-
erate the population of fragments resulting from a collision event.
The initial input data to our model comes from the satellite catalogue
SATCAT4 and the TLE (two-line element set) database5.
We model the space debris removal dilemma as a two-player
game, with players being the United States (US) and the European
Union (EU). The strategic interaction results from the fact that de-
bris removal by one player may affect the collision risks to others as
well. The players’ actions are defined by the number of debris objects
that will be removed, being either 0, 1, or 2 high risk objects every
2 years. We assume self-interested agents, meaning that each player
first removes objects which directly threaten their active satellites,
and only then consider objects which present a collision risk in gen-
eral. The payoffs are based on risk of collision to each player’s active
satellites, multiplied by the cost of losing an asset Cl, and minus the
costs of object removal Cr .
3 SIMULATION RESULTS AND PROJECTIONS
We use our simulator to project the evolution of debris and colli-
sion risks with a time horizon of 150 years, i.e. the period 2016-
2165, while repeating the launch history of 2006-2015 with a 0.5%
4 https://celestrak.com 5 https://www.space-track.org/
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Figure 1. Debris evolution in LEO for next 150 years
yearly increase. For each combination of actions we average over
160 Monte-Carlo runs to account for randomness in the collision and
break-up modules. Figure 1 shows the evolution of objects in LEO
for different numbers of objects removed by the US and the EU. We
observe an exponential growth trend without mitigation, in line with
previous findings [5]. One can clearly see that removing high risk ob-
jects leads to reduced growth in the total number of objects in LEO.
The cumulative risks to both players resulting from the debris evolu-
tion in Figure 1 are given in the following table:
EU 2 EU 1 EU 0
US 2 0.03413, 0.03733 0.05247, 0.07108 0.07704, 0.27474
US 1 0.06073, 0.06352 0.09499, 0.10405 0.10885, 0.31401
US 0 0.25022, 0.07368 0.28848, 0.12447 0.34261, 0.36385
4 GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
We derive the payoff matrix for the two players (US and EU) from
the risks given above for varying levels of cost of removal Cr (as-
suming w.l.g. Cl = 1), and find the Nash equilibria. We identify two
interesting regions in the range of costs Cr . For very low costs, re-
moving 0 will never be a best response for either player. Similarly, for
high costs, removing 2 will never be a best response. Therefore we
can focus on two sub-games defined by the action-pairs {0, 1} and
{1, 2}. We compute Nash equilibria for a range of Cr , and visualise
the results in Figure 2 for the sub-game {0, 1} (we observe similar
results for the sub-game {1, 2}). On the y-axis we have the prob-
ability of playing the first action in each sub-game (which equals 1
minus the probability of the second action) for US (top) and EU (bot-
tom). The colours/line styles indicate the action pairs that make up
the equilibria, e.g. the solid lines in Figure 2 correspond to the pure
Nash equilibria (0, 0) (black) and (1, 1) (red). In the figure we see
transitions from the single Nash equilibrium at (0, 0), to a situation
where three equilibria exist (at (0, 1), (1, 0), and one mixed), and
finally back to a single pure equilibrium at (1, 1). These transition
phases also include a stage in which only one of the asymmetric pure
equilibria at (1, 0) or (0, 1) exists. These result from the asymme-
try that is inherent in the risk matrix due to players having different
numbers of assets in different orbits.
In general, ADR has a positive effect not only for the instigator
of the removal but also for other players, and this is the cause of
the dilemma that we are studying. In game-theoretic terminology,
this suggests that we have games with a weak strategic substitutes
property. Any two-player game that has this property admits a pure
equilibrium, which is important for many practical purposes [1].
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Figure 2. Equilibrium strategies for the sub-game {0, 1} for a range of Cr .
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We have introduced a multi-player non-cooperative game named the
Space Debris Removal Dilemma based on prediction data from our
space debris and satellite simulator. The game highlights how the ra-
tional behaviour of players varies depending on the cost of active
debris removal versus the value of active satellites. In our game-
theoretic analysis we identified which removal strategies for the dif-
ferent actors are in equilibrium with each other, i.e. which strategies
purely rational actors are expected to decide on. We demonstrated the
sensitivity of these equilibrium strategies to the ratio between cost of
debris removal and the value of the active satellites. Although the
costs of active debris removal are still prohibitively high at the mo-
ment they are expected to decrease with future technological devel-
opments while the value of orbiting assets may increase. The results
of this work help to better understand the debris removal problem
and its short and long term consequences.
In future work we aim to move from a one-shot normal-form game
to a stochastic or extensive-form game, where the agents can decide
on their strategy based on the history of past play. In addition, we
will consider a larger set of players, representing e.g. the main space
agencies and commercial stakeholders that are currently active.
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